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Executive Summary 
The health sector has long been identified as being one of the most corrupt in high-, middle- 
and low-income countries. It faces particular challenges given competing incentives of public 
and private providers, knowledge asymmetry between providers and patients/clients, and 
the vulnerability of those seeking care. Corruption takes different forms, including informal 
payments, absenteeism, medicine theft, fraud and bribes for professional advancement.  
The impact of corruption is often greatest at the facility level, during patient encounters that 
typically take place away from the public gaze. In Africa, corruption has been shown to 
impact most adversely on poor, rural populations and has been associated with an increase 
in child mortality. Findings from post-Soviet nations show that experiences of corruption 
substantially reduce satisfaction with health care. More recently, it has been recognised that 
unless corruption is more effectively tackled within health systems, the goal of universal 
health coverage is unlikely to be realised in many countries.  
Health policy and systems research (HPSR) acknowledges the critical role of governance in 
health systems strengthening, the achievement of universal health coverage and equitable 
financing. Yet this field has failed to integrate a focus on corruption effectively, resulting in a 
critical lack of theory development and generation of empirical evidence to support change.  
This working paper contributes to the debate on corruption within health systems in low- 
and middle-income countries by reviewing theory development and empirical evidence on 
the ways in which social structures and political economy factors drive corrupt provider 
practice in sub-Saharan Africa. We explore conditions that enable corrupt activities among 
health workers – examining evidence on the morality or justifications for corruption – and 
how these relate to the health system, social structures and the political economy in 
particular contexts.  
We find that relatively little research has focused on the drivers of corruption among 
frontline health workers in sub-Saharan Africa. Fifteen papers describe in sufficient depth 
the factors that have enabled or driven corruption among frontline staff in the region, 
discussing behaviours such as absenteeism, informal payments, illegal dual practice or 
moonlighting, irregularities around drugs/theft of medicines, bribes and inappropriate 
referral. Most explore three different areas of practice that facilitate and drive corruption, 
namely: i) the structure and operation of the health system, its formal rules and 
implicit/informal rules, values and organisational behaviour; ii) social, familial and 
community practices, relationships and values; and iii) national political and economic 
factors that shape health workers’ rent-seeking or corrupt activities. The majority of papers 
focus on the health system and the conditions that have made corruption possible. We 
found the least evidence on the political economy of corruption in the health sector and a 
lack of data on the ways in which demographic characteristics such as gender and class 
shape the necessity or opportunity for some forms of corruption.  
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We conclude that HPSR should draw on work that seeks to make sense of the realities and 
complexity of rule-breaking behaviour – related to the ideas around ‘everyday governance’ – 
and incorporate a political economy perspective on developmental governance. Such an 
approach would draw out the ways in which formal and informal systems intertwine in the 
health sector, and would recognise the unequal power relations, political organisation and 
discourses that underpin rule-breaking and rule-abiding behaviour among different actors. 
These are critical as the basis for targeted, high impact, anti-corruption interventions.   
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1. Introduction  
The health sector has long been identified as being among the most corrupt in high-, middle- 
and low-income countries (Lewis, 2006; Savedoff and Hussmann, 2006; Vian, 2008; Mackey 
et al., 2018). Competing incentives and knowledge asymmetry between multiple agents, 
combined with the vulnerability of those seeking care and considerable public expenditure 
creates opportunities for rent-seeking and the diversion of funds across different types of 
systems (Savedoff and Hussmann, 2006). Different forms of corruption – including informal 
payments, absenteeism, medicine theft, fraud and bribes for professional advancement – 
can be found in many health systems worldwide (OECD, 2017; Mackey et al., 2018; Naher et 
al., 2018; Onwujekwe et al., 2018). Often, the effects are greatest at the facility level, during 
patient encounters that take place away from the public gaze and where providers shape 
what care is available to the population (Lewis, 2006). In Africa, corruption has been shown 
to have the most adverse impact on poor, rural populations (Witvliet et al., 2013; Kankeu 
and Ventelou, 2016) and has been associated with an increase in child mortality (Hanf et al., 
2011). Findings from post-Soviet nations show that experiences of corruption substantially 
reduce satisfaction with health care (Habibov, 2016). More recently it has been recognised 
that unless corruption is tackled more effectively within health systems, the goal of universal 
health coverage is unlikely to be realised in many countries (Greer and Méndez, 2015).  
Although the need to develop effective anti-corruption strategies for health systems is 
increasingly accepted, it remains low on the policy agenda in many countries (Hutchinson et 
al., 2018a). Attempts to change practices in both high- and low-income settings have been 
remarkably patchy, with limited success at scale (Gaitonde et al., 2016; Molina et al., 2016) 
while initiatives have been short lived (Jakab and Kutzin, 2009). Findings from a Cochrane 
review on effective anti-corruption interventions provide a wake-up call to researchers and 
policy-makers alike, concluding that there is ‘a paucity of evidence regarding how best to 
reduce corruption in health systems’ (Gaitonde et al., 2016: 2).  
This working paper seeks to foster debate on developing effective ways to tackle corruption 
in health systems in low- and middle-income countries. It discusses recent developments in 
corruption and anti-corruption research that have emerged from sectors beyond health, and 
considers the evidence base in public health and whether we have the requisite knowledge 
of the drivers of corruption among frontline health staff to construct more politically astute 
and pragmatic approaches within health systems policy and practice. Focusing on sub-
Saharan Africa – a region that is experiencing both extensive health challenges and weak 
health systems, and that has well-documented high levels and diverse corruption 
(Onwujekwe et al., 2018) – we review what is known about the circumstances under which 
health workers break the rules and use public health resources for private gain. We then 
discuss the implications for research that is needed to fill the knowledge gap and inform 
policies seeking to strengthen health systems. 
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2. Background  
Governance research, policy and practice can be viewed as having gone through three 
interconnected phases (Hout and Robison, 2008; Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). In the 
first, there was a shared understanding that technical (good governance) interventions 
(legal, regulatory and policy interventions) were needed to protect market-based 
development from patronage networks that were considered to stifle economic (and social) 
development (Hout and Robison, 2008; Lange, 2008). In the second phase – introduced in 
the World Development Report 2004 – technocratic approaches remained, but there was a 
shift in emphasis to accountability mechanisms that supported citizens and civil society 
organisations as they sought to hold civil servants to account (World Bank, 2004). Novel 
ways of bypassing what were termed the ‘long routes’ to democratic accountability – which 
involved citizens influencing policy-makers and politicians through elections – were 
constructed, enabling greater pressure on public servants by means of choice of services 
(Gaventa and McGee, 2013). Concerns about governance as a problem of collective action 
(where an individual’s self-interest occurs in conflict with the group) became more 
prominent (Teorell, 2007; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015a).  
By the late 2000s, however, there was disquiet about the failure of many good governance 
mechanisms to deliver better development outcomes (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011, Johnsøn et al., 
2012). There were also concerns that the dominant (technocratic) approach to governance 
was unable to take account of the political drivers of poor governance and development 
more generally (Hout and Robison, 2008; Khan, 2013). A broader movement to render 
visible the political nature of social and economic change as a means to improving 
development outcomes (Leftwich, 2005; Hickey, 2008; Schwertheim, 2017) thus led to a 
third wave of governance research, focusing mainly on the political economy. This research 
seeks to account for the distribution of power and resources and its influence on the 
development of organisations and rules (Hout and Robison, 2008; Fritz et al., 2009; 
Sundaram and Chowdhury, 2012). Under the rubric of ‘cumulative incrementalism’ (Levy, 
2014), ‘developmental governance’ (Khan, 2013) or ‘problem-driven governance’ (Fritz et al., 
2009), a common understanding has emerged that the political economy and, in particular, 
the distribution of resources through formal and informal structures, limits the type and 
extent of governance reforms that are likely to be effective in low- and middle-income 
countries. Hence, it is believed that approaches to governance should: 
1 be directed at a specific problem  
2 focus on ‘good enough governance’ reforms – those priorities and improvements that 
will have high impact but which are also feasible to address within the current 
distribution of power/resources  
3 seek improvements in governance and anti-corruption that are specific to time and place 
rather than applying existing blueprints (Fritz et al., 2009; Khan, 2013; Levy, 2014; 
Schwertheim, 2017).  
Instead of searching for universally applicable bureaucratic or technical fixes to weak 
accountability or lack of transparency, these approaches seek to understand what motivates 
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stakeholders, the sources and distribution of rents (Khan et al., 2016), interactions among 
formal and informal institutions that support coalitions, and new incentive structures to 
enable anti-corruption interventions to become more effective (Fritz et al., 2009).  
2.1. Existing governance and anti-corruption frameworks 
in health  
Governance research started somewhat later in health than in other sectors, with the 
publication of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2004 being an important 
milestone. The emerging HPSR research has consistently highlighted the critical role of 
governance in improving health outcomes (Ciccone et al., 2014), health systems 
strengthening, expanding health care coverage (Balabanova et al., 2013; Gilson et al., 2017) 
and equitable financing (Fryatt et al., 2017). While (as in other sectors) effective 
interventions remain elusive, there have been significant theoretical and methodological 
developments (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011; Gilson et al., 2017; Pyone et al., 2017). Pyone 
and colleagues (2017) have identified 17 governance frameworks used in health systems 
research showing the growing interest in understanding and addressing governance across 
all health-system building blocks. There have also been advances in empirical work, as 
analysts have moved beyond the concept of governance as a normative goal, and have 
sought to explain how people make and apply rules across the health system (Kwamie et al., 
2017; Nyikuri et al., 2017; Gilson and Agyepong, 2018).   
As in other sectors, ‘new institutional economics’ has been an important theory 
underpinning work on governance (Pyone et al., 2017), providing one of the most influential 
frameworks in the sector. Abimbola et al. (2017) argue that there have been three main 
approaches to the conceptualisation of governance in health, with some focusing on the 
state as a key actor with powers to shape governance (as in institutional economics) and 
newer approaches – on formal and informal rules:  
1 good governance/government-focused (see also Siddiqi et al., 2009)  
2 health systems approaches (see also Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011) 
3 institutional approaches that are concerned with the formal and informal rules that 
underpin the activity of frontline staff.  
Echoing the dissatisfaction expressed in the political economy critique of first- and second-
wave approaches to governance, Abimbola and colleagues (2017) criticise ‘good governance’ 
approaches in health for i) failing to take into account the specificities of the sector, ii) 
providing a normative rather than a descriptive framework, and iii) focusing too much on the 
government level. Health systems approaches that conceptualise governance as affecting 
the operation of all health system functions and institutional analysis that focuses on rules 
are both useful in allowing for analysis at different scales (so the interrelationships between 
local, national and global forces can be taken into account). Such approaches also draw into 
focus formal and informal processes that are at play in low-income countries (Abimbola et 
al., 2017).  
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While Abimbola et al.’s argument emphasises the importance of understanding formal and 
informal rules across different scales to make sense of governance within health systems, 
there is also a need to continue examining the ways in which power and politics shape 
formal and informal rules, constraining the type of intervention that might be successful. 
Thus Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith’s (2004) earlier work demonstrates how patronage and 
patrimonialism influence health system governance, while more recent work seeks to place 
principal agent relations in a political context (Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2013).  
Elsewhere in HPSR, interest in the interconnections between formal and informal rules and 
ways of working in low- and middle-income settings has emerged, particularly in relation to 
how they manifest at the frontline of care (‘everyday governance’). Again, this approach 
pushes beyond the normative frameworks of good governance (the description of how 
things should be). It develops understandings of the realities of everyday practice in low- and 
middle-income countries by analysing how they are shaped by organisational and social 
forces, many of which also exist outside the health system (Gilson et al., 2017; Kwamie et al., 
2017). However, these approaches may not fully take into account the broader distribution 
of power and resources within society and how they affect the microcosm that is the health 
system. Many potential interventions to improve governance continue to advocate forms of 
intervention that disrupt existing power structures by developing civil society organisations 
and empowering citizens, or promoting transparency, with less attention to whether this 
type of action is likely to succeed and whether it is possible within those power structures to 
achieve better outcomes (Fryatt et al., 2017).  
As a sub-set of governance, the discourse and objectives of anti-corruption efforts within 
health were established by three influential papers (Lewis, 2006; Savedoff and Hussmann, 
2006; Vian, 2008). These papers blend technocratic reforms with civil society/social-inclusion 
mechanisms and seek to tackle corruption through improvements in transparency and 
accountability. The critiques of the good governance approach (see above) can be applied, 
therefore, to these formulations of anti-corruption models and frameworks. In some ways, 
the literature on corruption in health is more advanced than the general development 
literature on good governance and corruption. It recognised early on the need for sector-
specific strategies, that options for action will always be curtailed without leadership at 
national level (Vian, 2008; Abimbola et al., 2017), and that the context – that is, the dynamic 
and complex nature of the health systems –  always has to be taken into account (Mikkelsen-
Lopez et al., 2011). While researchers have advocated best-practice examples and 
problematic blueprints for intervention (Levy, 2014), some space has been given over to 
understanding how national context influences corruption, with its importance underscored 
through case studies and locating debates in their historical context (Vian et al., 2012). 
Moreover, researchers have been attentive to the need for a targeted rather than broad-
brush approach to anti-corruption (Mikkelsen-Lopez et al., 2011).  
Despite these advances, reliance on neoclassical economic models of behaviour (primarily 
principal–agent theory) in much of the literature has left two gaps that are particularly 
problematic for health. The first is a failure to consider the ways in which the national and 
local distribution of (organisational) power (i.e. politics) and the distribution of resources 
influences the type of corruption that emerge in different settings. We can describe this as 
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the informal system or way of working that sits behind the formal health system and 
influences practice within the health sector. The second gap relates to the assumptions that 
health workers and civil servants are profit-maximising rational actors who are always 
interested to take advantage of conditions to increase their income, so corruption occurs in 
the spaces where there is a lack of governance allowing actors to gain unfair advantage. 
While principal–agent theory has been criticised for ignoring context and for making 
assumptions about the motivation of the principals (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015b; Khan et 
al., 2016; Baez Camargo and Passas, 2017) it also entails assumptions around what drives 
action (profit maximisation), and so denies relevance to what we might consider the distinct 
social, economic and political drivers of corruption that prevail in low- and middle-income 
settings, where rule-breaking is often commonplace. This critique implies that, rather than 
seeking to maximise profits, health workers are often just seeking to survive where wages 
are often too low to cover their basic needs, health workers are too few to provide effective 
services, medical resources are lacking, and resources are often distributed through informal 
networks.  
While accountability and transparency approaches to corruption remain dominant in much 
of the mainstream public health literature (Mackey et al., 2018), recent research from Baez 
Camargo and colleagues have sought to find new ways of understanding corruption (Baez 
Camargo and Sambaiga, 2015; Baez Camargo and Passas, 2017; Baez Camargo and Koechlin, 
2018). Drawing on ideas of collective action (see Marquette and Peiffer (2015b) for a 
description of collective action approaches to corruption and their relationship to principal–
agent theory), this body of research highlights the critical role that informal social networks 
(based on kinship or other forms of social solidarity) play to solve problems in the contexts 
of severe resource constraints (Baez Camargo and Passas, 2017). At the level of frontline 
services, in their descriptions corruption emerges less as the act of a profit-maximising 
individual and more as a collective strategy though which groups exchange favours and 
distribute resources within both tight- and looser-knit groups. While the authors stop short 
of describing how such distribution is informed by particular forms of personhood and 
morality that have long been in evidence in Southern and Eastern Africa (Englund, 1996; 
Ferguson, 2013), they describe how these networks of exchange can have powerful moral 
imperatives. Baez Camargo and Sambaiga (2015) examine the multiple relationships: the 
social contract (the way that state–citizen relations are perceived by citizens), the ways in 
which the political economy shapes understanding of social solidarity (and the exclusion of 
citizens from many benefits that those in power have) and the distribution of resources 
through social networks all shaping the likelihood of illicit. While this approach provides a 
good basis to begin thinking about particular forms of good enough or developmental 
governance that tackles specific health systems problems, this remains unexplored in the 
literature. Recent work has either focused on national-level politics or grassroots networks 
but has not combined the two. It has also shifted from a focus on the ways in which 
economic and political organisations and alliances shape corruption to the use of 
behavioural economics and psychological insights (Stahl et al., 2017).  
In this paper, we seek to add to the existing literature by developing a more nuanced 
account of corruption that takes into account the ways in which formal and informal political 
and economic structures shape corruption within health systems. We began by conducting a 
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systematic review of the facilitators, enablers and drivers of corruption among frontline 
health workers in sub-Saharan Africa. Our geographic focus reflects the need to consider the 
historical and political differences that drive different types of corruption and the potential 
for anti-corruption interventions. Although sub-Saharan Africa is a remarkably diverse 
region, there are similarities that makes such a geographic focus useful. No countries in this 
region have a developed welfare state, all (except Liberia and Ethiopia) have powerful 
colonial legacies, and many have institutions and organisations (including legal systems, 
health systems and processes of government) that continue to reflect this colonial history. 
Many of the countries have also had to restructure their economies under structural 
adjustment programmes, and most have experienced an influx of programmes and 
investments (that often distort as well as support health systems) from major global health 
actors including bilateral donors, international organisations, philanthro-capitalists and non-
governmental organisations. Health services coverage remains patchy in all countries 
despite receipt of extensive investment and health system strengthening initiatives by 
national governments and donors. And in many countries the population suffers from high 
rates of poverty, tuberculosis, HIV and malaria and now faces a growing burden of non-
communicable disease. While there are, of course, marked differences in the rates and 
prevalent forms of corruption across countries (Baez Camargo and Koechlin, 2018), high 
levels of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa are well documented (Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016; 
Onwujekwe et al., 2018).  
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3. Methods and definitions 
3.1. Objective 
To identify how and why health workers break the rules and use public resources for private 
gain within health systems in sub-Saharan Africa.  
3.2. Definitions 
Health systems – The combination of resources, financing, management and delivery 
systems through which health services are provided to the population  
Corruption – Misuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2018) 
Informal payments – Payments made by patients or their relatives for services that are 
intended to be provided formally free of charge or at a lower price  
Political settlement – A society’s institutional structure and the policies that flow from it, (‘a 
social order’) where the distribution of power is in line with the distribution of benefits 
within that society 
Rent-seeking – Earnings in excess of all relevant costs or the effort to acquire opportunities 
for earning rents  
Sub-Saharan Africa – as defined by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) – 
46 of Africa’s 54 countries (excluding Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, 
Sudan and Tunisia) 
3.3. Eligibility criteria 
The following inclusion and exclusion criteria were defined for our literature searches:  
Inclusion criteria: 
 Population: health workers and managers of frontline staff working in public sector 
clinics, hospitals and primary care centres 
 Timing: studies published between 2000 and 2018 
 Setting: low- and middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
 Sources: published and grey literature reporting empirical findings 
 Study design: no restrictions 
 Language: English only 
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Exclusion criteria 
 Papers not containing data from frontline health staff and/or their managers 
 Studies not reporting empirical evidence: editorials, commentaries, viewpoints etc.  
 Papers outside sub-Saharan Africa.  
3.4. Search strategy 
Our initial search included all countries in low- and middle-income countries. We searched 
electronic bibliographic databases (EMBASE, MEDLINE, Social Policy and Practice, 
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature, EconLit,) from the year 2000 or 
database inception to 2018 to identify published articles or primary studies using 
combinations of keyword and/or subject heading and database search options of the terms 
listed below. To identify unpublished articles, systematic reviews and grey literature, we 
searched the following sources: Google, government websites, non-governmental 
organisation websites, the World Bank, UNDP, the World Health Organization (WHO), 
Transparency International, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), conference proceedings, PROSPERO and the Cochrane 
Library. We limited the search to published and grey literature available in the English 
language. Selection of articles and grey literature was based on the eligibility criteria set out 
above. A protocol was submitted to the PROSPERO international prospective register of 
systematic reviews.1  
The initial search identified a large number of papers (over 30,000 reduced to 10,000 papers 
by removing duplicates and by using search terms that screened out high-income countries). 
However, even after further screening, most had to be excluded to comply with our 
inclusion criteria. The majority of papers, even those matching the eligibility criteria and 
including empirical evidence on drivers of health-worker behaviour and corruption 
specifically, described these in passing or in insufficient depth. In order to enable meaningful 
analysis, we conducted internal searches2 to identify studies that offer relevant information 
with a sufficient breadth and depth on the factors that influence corrupt practice among 
providers.  
We identified eight papers using these internal search terms. A further three papers were 
identified, cited in the initial eight papers. Finally, a further four papers were identified by 
searching health literature from the Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium, 
which has focused on innovative anti-corruption research and intervention, with a focus on 
informal structures and political settlements, taking the total to 15 papers. The papers 





 Using a range of search terms drawn from systematic reviews on corruption in health under the School for Oriental and 
African Studies-led Anti-Corruption Evidence (ACE) Research Consortium Naher et al. (2018) and Onwujekwe et al. (2018).   
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All publications were screened by two researchers and relevant information was extracted 
to allow analysis according to three analytical domains, as follows. 
3.5. Analytical approach 
Drawing on the political economy approaches to corruption and the need for a nuanced 
understanding of the drivers of corruption among health workers, our analysis sought to 
disentangle the ways in which formal and informal structures created spaces where:  
1 corruption is possible  
2 difficult living conditions, and social and political pressures create necessity for 
corruption  
3 corrupt activities could be considered just and morally acceptable (see Box 1 for further 
explanations of these analytical domains).  
Our interest therefore lies in understanding the factors that make corruption appear a 
necessity and the Kantian ‘necessary conditions’ (gaps, spaces and structures) that enable 
the existence of particular forms of corruption in the health system (Kant, 1998). In addition, 
we are concerned with local discourses, interpretations and justifications of rule-breaking 
practice. Under conditions of necessity, we coded factors that push health workers into 
corruption due to economic, social and sometimes physical survival of the health worker, 
their family, the survival of the clinic or health system and the delivery of care. Under 
enabling conditions for corruption, we have analysed the interconnected formal and 
informal structures and frameworks within which resources are distributed. Finally, under 
local discourse, interpretations and justifications of rule-breaking practice, we have explored 
the ways in which these actions are explained, defended or condemned by health workers 
and patients.  
Box 1 Analytical domains 
Conditions of necessity – elements that mean that it is impossible for health workers to 
avoid being involved in corrupt action as these are critical to their survival. 
Conditions of possibility (enabling conditions) – the interconnected structures that 
enable, facilitate or create the space for corruption or rule-breaking action.  
Local explanations and justifications – the rationale that health workers and patients 
give for corrupt activities and rule-breaking. 
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4. Findings  
4.1. Description of papers 
Overall, we identified 15 papers that describe in sufficient depth those factors that have 
enabled or driven corruption among frontline health workers in sub-Saharan Africa. Of 
these, Tanzania appears most often as the setting of the study. The papers discuss the 
following types of corruption: absenteeism, informal payments, illegal dual practice or 
moonlighting, irregularities around drugs/theft of medicines, bribes and inappropriate 
referral. Appendix 2 provides a breakdown of papers on particular forms of corruption: most 
studies used only qualitative methods, some used mixed methods and only one (Lindkvist, 
2013) relied on quantitative methods alone.  
The majority of papers explore three different areas of practice that drive or facilitate 
corruption, namely:  
1 structure and operation of the health system and its formal rules, as well as 
implicit/informal rules, values and organisational behaviour;  
2 social, familial and community practices, relationships and values; and  
3 national political and economic factors that shape health workers’ rent-seeking or 
corrupt behaviour (see Appendix 2, Table A1).  
Most papers focus on the health system, with many classified under the enabling conditions 
or forces that make corruption a possibility. This is unsurprising, given the dominance of 
principal–agent theory in anti-corruption work in the health sector. We found the least 
evidence on the political economy of corruption in the health sector but were also surprised 
at the lack of data on the ways in which sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender 
and class, shape the necessity for some forms of corruption (absenteeism, for example) and 
the ways in which opportunities for corruption are structured by these social forces.  
Findings are synthesised and interpreted under the three analytical domains of corruption: 
conditions of necessity, conditions of possibility (enabling conditions), and local explanations 
and justifications. Within each domain, we discuss drivers of health workers’ corrupt 
practices related to the health system; social, familial and community relationships and 
values; and political economy factors. 
4.2. Conditions of necessity for corruption  
Eleven of the papers explore structures and practices that are considered to make 
corruption necessary for survival for those working within the health system. This includes 
social financial, political and physical pressures that make it impossible to survive without 
breaking rules and rent-seeking. The major emerging themes relate to inadequate pay in the 
public sector (Ferrinho et al., 2004; Stringhini et al., 2009; Akwataghibe et al., 2013; Pieterse 
and Lodge, 2015; Tweheyo et al., 2017; Anders and Makene, 2018); very poor working 
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conditions (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006); obligations to care for family members (Stringhini 
et al., 2009; Akwataghibe et al., 2013; Tweheyo et al., 2017; Baez Camargo and Koechlin, 
2018) and the central role that informal social networks play in distributing resources (Baez 
Camargo and Koechlin, 2018); the mismatch between entitlements and available resources 
(Baez Camargo and Koechlin, 2018; Sambaiga et al., 2018); and the creation of private-sector 
markets under neoliberal health policies (Paina et al., 2014).  
4.2.1. Conditions of necessity related to the health system 
Although neither provides exact details of health worker pay, both Stringhini et al. (2009) 
and Anders and Makene (2018)  argue that informal payments operate as the means 
through which health workers are able to live on otherwise inadequate pay and lack of 
economic incentives. Informal payments and dual practice are described as compensating 
for poor salaries, consistent delays in payment of wages and travel reimbursements. In 
Mozambique and Cape Verde, Ferrinho and colleagues (2004) describe how the sale of 
stolen medicines take on the same role by enabling health workers to survive on their very 
low salaries.  
Alongside more general descriptions of the difficulties of living on low public-sector salaries, 
Akwataghibe et al.’s (2013) paper provides important details on Nigerian health workers. 
Only 13% of 165 health workers surveyed considered their salaries satisfactory and 38% of 
respondents had monthly expenditures in excess of their wage. In Uganda, Tweheyo and 
colleagues (2017) describe how health workers’ inadequate salaries and frequent lack of 
payment drive absenteeism as health workers have to supplement their income elsewhere. 
Finally, in Sierra Leone, Pieterse and Lodge (2015) consider how reliance on unpaid 
volunteers in a setting with high levels of poverty drives informal payments. In the health 
centres studied, unpaid volunteers often delivered frontline services in return for payments 
from patients rather than a salary, a practice that is viewed as commonplace. 
Writing about Ethiopia, Lindelow and Serneels (2006) broaden the debate away from purely 
financial or material concerns. They describe how excessive workload, inadequate facilities 
and lack of materials create very poor working conditions for health workers (doctors, 
nurses, and health assistants) in rural areas. Within the constraints of the formal system, 
their only recourse to action is to bribe officials who can transfer them to an urban area or 
to absent themselves from work. As we see below, the opportunities to transfer depend on 
the position of the health worker in a social network (knowing which officials to approach) 
and wealth (whether they can afford to pay the official).  
4.2.2. Conditions of necessity related to social and socioeconomic forces 
As we described above, Akwataghibe et al. (2013) report how health workers in Nigeria were 
often dissatisfied with their salaries. All the health workers interviewed stated that their 
salaries were important for their extended families, with analysis of monthly expenditure 
highlighting the importance of food for their household, school fees for children and costs of 
dependents. Caring for extended family members was often expected rather than a matter 
What drives health workers to break the rules and use public resources for private gain? 
16 
of choice, with two interviewees reporting how their high social status as health workers 
obliged them to look after family members.  
‘Whether you like it or not, society always expects a great deal from you, and the fact that 
society now worships wealth means that you are constantly under that pressure. And if you 
are not getting what you think is a fair deal from your employers, the onus is now on you; 
otherwise, other people will think badly of you’ (doctor, Nasarawa) (Akwataghibe et al., 
2013). 
In Stringhini et al.’s work on Tanzania, these wider responsibilities were alluded to by one 
health worker: ‘salary itself can never sustain even food for the whole month, not to talk 
about school fees for our schoolchildren’ (Health Worker, Dispensary of Mwendapole) 
(Stringhini et al., 2009). Similarly, in Uganda, Tweheyo et al. (2017) describe the clash 
between expectations that doctors (given their social status) should be able to access high 
quality education for their children and the financial demands of the recently privatised 
education system that cannot be met by low paid doctors who work in the public system. 
This puts considerable pressure on doctors to take on extra work to afford the high fees in 
elite schools. Interestingly, the authors provide the only data that we found on gendered 
differences in absenteeism among health workers, with women facing greater demands to 
take care of sick relatives. Importantly, unlike their male counterparts, this work is unpaid 
and so provides little benefit for female health workers. Tweheyo et al. also describe how 
social norms demand that many people attend funerals, which takes health workers away 
from their posts, sometimes without authorised leave. 
In their comparison of Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, Baez Camargo and Koechlin (2018) 
and Stahl and Kassa (2018) describe the central role that obligations to kin and non-kin 
groups play in shaping corrupt practices in the health sector, creating the means through 
which scarce resources are redistributed. Echoing a doctor in Akwatahibe and colleague’s 
(2013) study in Nigeria, both papers argue that, in Tanzania and Uganda, social networks are 
based on and reinforce strong socioeconomic obligations between kin groups. Among non-
kin (colleagues, friends and acquaintances), these networks tend to involve more 
personalised transactions of gifts and counter gifts that provide mutual assistance and 
reciprocity. Kin underpins moral obligations to share material resources and non-kin 
relationships can have these moral obligations embedded in them or can be more pragmatic 
or instrumental. Stahl and Kassa (2018) and Baez Camargo and Koechlin (2018) underscore 
the power of these social relationships in Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Individuals are 
obliged to participate in these social networks; those who refuse membership or act against 
the illicit distribution of resources within these networks are sanctioned by those around 
them (ibid.). Rejecting a gift or refusing to provide preferential treatment (especially to 
family) can destroy an individual’s social standing (Stahl and Kassa, 2018).  
Favours granted through kin- or non-kin-based social networks have a particular logic and 
leave the client indebted to the sponsor/patron. In turn, such indebtedness skews practice in 
the health system towards maintaining networks rather than improving the function of the 
system and delivering high-quality care. Subsequently, staff promotions are often dependent 
on social relations rather than on performance; patients whom a health worker might wish 
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to call upon for a favour in the future may be treated first; or patients will provide 
unsolicited gifts in an attempt to create indebtedness on the part of the provider.  
4.2.3. Conditions of necessity related to the political economy 
When considering conditions of necessity in relation to the political economy in the health 
sector, we are concerned with the ways in which the distribution of power, benefits or 
resources have shaped the types of corruption that have emerged and the health workers 
involved. We found very few studies on the ways in which powerful groups distribute 
benefits or rents within the health system, nor ways in which patronage underpins the 
distribution of health resources and the delivery of care among frontline health workers.  
Analyses of the Tanzanian and Ugandan health systems place corrupt behaviours in the 
context of a fundamental mismatch between citizens’ official entitlements (i.e. free primary 
care at the point of delivery) and the realities of the resource-limited settings (that is, the 
impossibility of care being made available to all citizens) (Baez Camargo and Koechlin, 2018). 
In comparison to Rwanda, where much progress has been made towards universal health 
coverage and a reduction in corrupt practices among frontline providers, in Tanzania and 
Uganda personal relationships remain a critical way by which people can gain access to 
money, positions of power and public services. These relationships pervade the public sector 
to the extent that most patients interviewed knew that they had to participate in some form 
of informal transaction in order to obtain a service (Baez Camargo and Sambaiga, 2015; Baez 
Camargo and Koechlin, 2018).  
Paina et al. (2014) take a historical approach to explore the different economic and political 
path dependencies that have shaped dual practice in the Ugandan health system. The 
constraints created by neoliberal health policies of the 1980s and 1990s (in particular 
structural adjustment programmes) saw the drawing back of the state, the fostering of poor 
pay in the public sector and the growth of the private sector. This created the economic 
conditions of necessity (through poor pay) and the structural enabling conditions (the 
creation of a private health sector) through which dual practice could emerge as a logical 
strategy for doctors seeking additional income.  
4.3. Conditions of possibility for corruption in the health 
sector 
All 15 papers examine the opportunities and enabling conditions for corruption that are 
created through the structure and organisation of the health system and its institutions. 
Such conditions include: resource scarcity (Ferrinho et al., 2004; Mæstad and Mwisongo, 
2011; Akwataghibe et al., 2013; Pieterse and Lodge, 2015); the presence of private players 
and facilities in the health sector (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006; Akwataghibe et al., 2013; 
Paina et al., 2014; Topp et al., 2014; Tweheyo et al., 2017; Anders and Makene, 2018); 
skewed economic incentives (Serneels et al., 2016) a lack of disciplinary procedures and the 
absence of accountability mechanisms (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006, Ferrinho et al., 2004, 
Akwataghibe et al., 2013, Pieterse and Lodge, 2015, Stringhini et al., 2009, Paina et al., 2014, 
What drives health workers to break the rules and use public resources for private gain? 
18 
Tweheyo et al., 2017, Topp et al., 2014); power imbalances, culture/language and social 
networks (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006; Lindkvist, 2013; , Topp et al., 2014; Pieterse and 
Lodge, 2015; Serneels et al., 2016; Tweheyo et al., 2017).  
4.3.1. Conditions of possibility related to the health system 
Resource scarcity and markets for corrupt practice  
While scarcity of resources have been shown to be a driver of corrupt practices among 
health workers, it is also described in some studies as having created the spaces within 
which corrupt practices can become lucrative for some individuals. Ferrinho et al. (2004), 
Mæstad and Mwisongo (2011), Akwataghibe et al. (2013), Pieterse and Lodge (2015) and 
Anders and Makene (2018) all discuss the ways in which the potential to extract rents (in the 
form of informal payments) or to make money selling stolen medicine is created by the 
generalised scarcity of human resources and consumables in the health systems in Tanzania, 
Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Nigeria.  
In Tanzania, the lack of health workers creates long waiting times, which encourages 
patients who have access to money to make informal payments for faster services (Mæstad 
and Mwisongo, 2011). This practice is considered to be so pervasive that combating informal 
payments will have to be part of a package of wider changes if rent-seeking is to be reduced 
(ibid.). Similar behaviours are reported in Mozambique and Cape Verde, where long queues 
to see health workers creates a space in which patients with resources are willing to make 
informal payments in order to jump the queue (Ferrinho et al., 2004).  
Ferrinho et al. (2004), Akwataghibe et al. (2013) and Anders and Makene (2018) make the 
point that corruption stems from poor access to medicines. In Mozambique and Cape Verde, 
this is a result of the short or irregular opening hours of health centres, which results in 
patients accessing medicines through alternative means. According to Ferrinho and 
colleagues (2004), some health workers will supply patients with medicines stolen from the 
public sector, thus creating a new market and exacerbating shortages within the public 
sector. In Nigeria, survey findings suggest that the lack of availability of drugs in health 
centres creates opportunities for health workers to sell drugs within public health facilities 
(Akwataghibe et al., 2013). Similarly, Anders and Makene (2018) describe how shortages of 
medicines within public hospitals and clinics in Tanzania create private markets for 
medicines. As these are largely unregulated, they can become a space in which medicines 
stolen from the public sector can be sold, which thus reduces the already limited stocks 
available in the system. 
While many studies focus on one form of corruption only, Lindelow and Serneels (2006) 
discuss multiple corrupt practices (including bribery, informal payments and absenteeism). 
They link informal payments to health workers’ sub-standard practice, arguing that some 
health workers purposefully provide a poor quality of care so that those who are able to pay 
privately for a better quality of care will be prompted to do so. They argue that if all health 
workers were providing a high standard of care, then the market for informal payments 
would not exist. 
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Dual practice  
While research on corruption often points to an excessive dependence on the public sector 
as one of the conditions that enables rent-seeking among health workers in low- and middle-
income countries (Vian, 2008), the evidence suggests that the existence of private health 
facilities and services drives corruption among frontline staff. Lindelow and Serneels (2006), 
Akwataghibe et al. (2013), Paina et al. (2014), Topp et al. (2014) and Tweheyo et al. (2017) 
all argue that the private sector creates new spaces for employment, and can have a 
negative effect in the public sector as a result of increased absenteeism.  
In Uganda, Paina et al. (2014) show that those engaged in dual practice will often use time 
when they are meant to be working in a public clinic or hospital to earn extra income. While 
dual practice can lead to absenteeism and pilfering in the public sector, the government has 
repeatedly failed to regulate it. Civil war, draconian economic policies (structural adjustment 
programmes), donor-led programmes and clinical research initiatives have created both the 
need and the opportunity for such private practice.  
In Nigeria, Zambia and Uganda opportunities for moonlighting or double-shifting are only 
available to some health workers (Akwataghibe et al., 2013; Topp et al., 2014; Tweheyo et 
al., 2017). In Zambia, health workers in urban areas can easily arrive late and leave their 
stations early, allowing them to practice in private clinics on the same day. Although Topp et 
al. (2014) also describe absenteeism in rural areas, the scope for earning additional income 
from private practice is much more limited here. Similarly, in Uganda, where both informal 
and formal private-sector providers are widespread, the potential to launch a drug shop or 
private clinic or undertake work in a private facility is severely curtailed by rural postings 
(Tweheyo et al., 2017). In urban areas, informal rules and regulations facilitate dual practice 
among doctors, which is largely supported by managers (Paina et al., 2014). Tweheyo and 
colleagues (2017) concur, describing dual practice as a form of negotiated absence and a 
form of rule-breaking that comes about through the recognition of deficiencies of the 
system and trying to accommodate the needs of health workers.  
In Nigeria, a combination of low staffing levels, poor quality of care in the public sector and 
weak regulatory regimes creates opportunities for private practice and moonlighting, but in 
varying ways across the different provinces (Akwataghibe et al., 2013). In Nasarawa 
province, a scarcity of health workers has led the local government to encourage staff to 
work privately, which is viewed – for reasons that are unclear – as a means to deliver more 
care overall rather than the likely reality of fuelling absenteeism in public facilities. 
Meanwhile, in Ondo province, it has been reported that there was a private market for 
doctors’ services, but a combination of good quality free health care provided by local and 
state government has restricted the establishment of a private market by nurses or other 
allied health professionals (Akwataghibe et al., 2013).  
Skewed economic incentives  
Serneels et al. (2016), writing about health-worker incomes, describe how the payment of 
per diems – lump sum payments provided to those attending workshops and training – 
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creates a new space for rent-seeking which drives absenteeism. Officially, per diem 
payments are provided as a form of compensation for travel, food costs and accommodation 
associated with trainings and meetings off site. However, in the context of low salaries, they 
are often understood to be a form of wage rather than compensation, or a source of 
supplementary income that depends on attendance at particular events regardless of 
whether the topic is important for that member of staff.  
Lack of disciplinary procedures and accountability mechanisms 
Eight papers note the absence of disciplinary procedures and accountability mechanisms as 
enabling corruption in sub-Saharan African health systems.  
Formal accountability arrangements in both the public and private sectors are weak in 
Ethiopia, and the health system is largely unregulated, which leaves it open to abuse. 
Lindelow and Serneels (2006) report a lack of incentives for officials to hold health service 
providers and workers to account and no effective system of reporting corruption. Ferrinho 
et al. (2004) list a range of problems in Mozambique and Cape Verde that create spaces in 
which health workers can pilfer medicines without being punished. This includes lack of 
effective control systems and inspections; the absence of systems to collect and retain 
income resulting from drug sales; poor organisation within pharmacies; insufficient 
knowledge amongst managers; and lack of penalties and punishment. However, evidence 
from Nigeria shows how even well-constructed rules and regulations are no guarantee of an 
effective system: Akwataghibe et al. (2013) report how rules controlling illegal actions (such 
as the pilfering and sale of medicines) are so rarely enforced that neither policy-makers nor 
health workers are clear as to the actual parameters of any rules.  
Pieterse and Lodge (2015) explore the ways in which a lack of disciplinary procedures shape 
corruption among providers in Sierra Leone. However, evidence from Tanzania suggests 
there is not always a straightforward relationship between disciplinary procedures and an 
absence of corrupt practice (Stringhini et al., 2009). Indeed, informal payments are reported 
to be commonplace in Tanzania, despite the fact that there is considerable concern among 
health workers that they will be caught by the authorities. This fear of disciplinary action 
generates stress and poor morale among staff, and yet corrupt behaviours continue 
(Stringhini et al., 2009).  
Paina et al.’s (2014) description of dual practice in Uganda provides historical evidence that 
it is the combination of poor salaries and ineffective enforcement of the rule of law that 
encourages corrupt behaviours. Colonial laws curtailing private practice became stricter 
after Ugandan independence. The rule of law collapsed and the imposition of military rule 
and civil war meant that it became impossible for health workers to live on their salaries. At 
the end of the war, managers did not have the tools to monitor staff absences but also did 
not have a strong imperative to do so as they knew that doctors needed to work elsewhere 
to survive economically. Tweheyo et al. (2017) concur that the imposition of accountability 
measures is impractical in Uganda: managers and district officials feel unable to discipline 
staff for absenteeism given the shortages of staff and poor payment systems.   
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Finally, Topp et al. (2014) provide insights into inadequate monitoring and regulation of 
absenteeism in Zambia. Here, poor quality data has meant that district-level managers do 
not know staffing levels or absenteeism rates at their facilities, which precludes effective 
mechanisms to account for the whereabouts of health workers. 
4.3.2. Conditions of possibility related to social and socioeconomic forces 
Five studies provide information on the enabling conditions for corruption in the health 
sector that relate to social and socioeconomic factors. In Sierra Leone, the differences in 
status and power between health workers and patients means that patients would never 
challenge their behaviour (Pieterse and Lodge, 2015). Similarly, in Ethiopia, there is a 
tradition of keeping quiet so people do not report corruption, which results in the Ministry 
of Health failing to assess the scale of the problem (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006). 
Meanwhile, in Tanzania, Lindkvist (2013) highlights the importance of language and tradition 
in concepts of corruption, noting that the Swahili culture makes no distinction between gifts 
and informal payments to buy a service.  
Serneels and colleagues (2016) draw together data from multiple low-income countries to 
show how central social networks are in the allocation of places at trainings/workshops. Per 
diem payments for workshops constitute an important source of income for health workers 
and attendance is controlled by senior health workers. In deciding who attends, decisions 
are made on the basis of personalised relationships, following the logic of patronage rather 
than one which identifies who is best placed institutionally to benefit from new knowledge. 
While Serneels and colleagues (2016) describes a more generalised form of corruption, 
Lindelow and Serneel’s (2006) work on Ethiopia usefully shows how an individual’s position 
within informal social networks structures absenteeism. They report that those with 
powerful social networks are able to refuse to take up rural postings and those who are 
wealthy bribe others to swap postings with them. The authors also report that opportunities 
for corrupt practice also dominate training, promotion and the allocation of beds based on 
social and kin networks rather than patient need. Importantly, Tweheyo et al. (2017) argue 
that research into the impact of class and gender on absenteeism or corruption more 
broadly is lacking, however. 
4.3.3. Conditions of possibility related to the political economy 
In Sierra Leone, Pieterse and Lodge (2015) argue that the lack of social contract between 
health workers and patients means that individual workers can demand informal payments 
without being challenged. The authors do not examine the idea of a social contract in detail, 
but they suggest that insecurity in post-conflict situations means that patients remain 
unconvinced that the state – acting through health workers – respect citizens’ entitlement to 
care.  
Topp and colleagues (2014) provide a useful example of the differences between various 
cadres of health workers, comparing the opportunities for absenteeism that exist among 
urban and rural staff. They describe a conflict between three social structures: first is the 
hierarchy created through health systems management, which makes nurses responsible for 
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management; second, in a bio-medical hierarchy doctors are more senior than nurses, which 
undermines the potential that nurse managers have to manage a health facility; and finally, 
there are political structures at play, and again doctors are seen to be more powerful within 
these. When nurses are appointed as managers they lack seniority within the medical 
hierarchy and have poorer connections to local politicians than their clinician colleagues. 
This means that nurses ultimately lack the power and authority to discipline particular 
individuals when they are absent from public health facilities.  
4.4. Local explanations and justifications for corrupt 
practice  
4.4.1. Discourses related to the health system 
Five papers discuss the ways in which health workers and patients understand morality or 
justify corruption (Ferrinho et al., 2004; Lindelow and Serneels, 2006; Stringhini et al., 2009; 
Mæstad and Mwisongo, 2011; Paina et al., 2014). We found no studies that relate the 
morality of corruption to the political economy. Instead, most studies justify corruption by 
the poor rates of pay which are often considered unfair and fail to reflect the hard or highly 
skilled nature of the work in question. In Uganda, for example, health workers reported that 
seeking additional payments beyond their formal employment is justified as they are being 
‘cheated’ by the government through low pay (Tweheyo et al., 2017). Mæstad and 
Mwisongo (2011) report how informal payments are influenced by the extent to which 
health workers’ efforts are fairly rewarded by the payment structure. In addition to the 
struggles of living on low wages, Stringhini et al. (2009)  also identify a gap between the 
perceived value of certain work (in terms of how demanding it is rather than status) and the 
pay provided, citing midwives as an example of high-demand and yet lowly paid positions.  
Under such conditions where pay is not considered to compensate sufficiently for the work 
done, informal rules emerge that enable health workers to claim supplementary income. 
Mæstad and Mwisongo (2011) suggest that health workers feel they have a legitimate claim 
to receive some informal income and that, when this is not shared fairly among staff, 
frustration and jealousy reduce motivation amongst workers. In Ethiopia, low pay – coupled 
with the fact that corruption is endemic in other sectors and therefore considered the 
‘norm’ in health too – means that health workers feel morally justified in taking small bribes 
in areas such as hospital admissions: ‘there is some humanity and assisting this [request for 
money] is okay….’ (Lindelow and Serneels, 2006). In contrast, Ferrinho et al. (2004) describe 
how workers in Mozambican and Cape Verdean health systems find themselves caught 
between wanting to do a decent job and the brutal facts of life that make them forgo such 
an aspiration.  
4.4.2. Discourses related to cultural and socioeconomic and political economy factors 
We found three studies that consider the ways in which discourse on corruption is shaped by 
social and socioeconomic relationships, but nothing on the political economy. In 
Mozambique and Cape Verde, the theft of medicines was justified if health workers were 
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stealing to give them to their neighbours and not for personal gain (Ferrinho et al., 2004). 
The authors argue that for successful and equitable policies to be enacted, it is necessary to 
separate those who are dishonest as a personal coping mechanism from those who are 
involved in organised crime and institutional misconduct.  
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5. Discussion and conclusion 
This working paper assesses available evidence on the drivers of corrupt practices in the 
health systems of sub-Saharan Africa to support new targeted approaches to anti-corruption 
in the health sector. We have explored the evidence on the conditions of necessity and 
possibility for corrupt activities (the enabling factors) among frontline health workers and 
have sought to understand the morality and justifications for certain practices. 
The paper shows that most data on drivers of corruption concern the health system context 
but there is a paucity of evidence on the socioeconomic and political dimensions of these 
drivers, and in particular on the importance of power differentials. There are suggestions 
that frontline staff in health systems are less affected by political patronage and alliances 
between elite and non-elite groups (Kelsall, 2018), which often relate to high-stake national 
processes. However, there are indications in the literature that this is not the case and that 
meso (organisational) and micro (individual) levels of care are equally affected. More 
research is needed to address this gap in the literature and to reveal the ways in which 
political networks support and enable corruption if more nuanced, targeted approaches to 
anti-corruption are to be enacted within health systems successfully.  
While we see an emerging interest in the way in which informal rules shape health systems, 
the available literature is currently divided according to those that focus on formal health 
system rules and constraints and those that are more interested in informal systems (social 
networks, systems of patronage and the distribution of rights and resources within them). In 
one set of papers, we find descriptions of health workers taking advantage of gaps in 
accountability or being pushed into taking advantage of these gaps due to scarce resources. 
While useful in demonstrating a space for corruption, these papers provide relatively little 
description of the informal structures that enable some actors to access scant resources and 
deny access to others. Another set of papers give considerable attention to social networks. 
Stahl and Kassa (2018: 7), for example, argue ‘a crucial observation is that the provision of 
health services is regulated not by formal entitlements but on the basis of informal social 
network relationships and social relational dynamics’. While they attend to the ways in 
which accessible services and the squeezing of discretionary space for health workers 
impacts on petty corruption, they provide little description of how the type of health system 
– the balance of public or private providers, forms of funding, the impact of health 
insurance, decentralisation and re-centralisation, vertical programmes and the involvement 
of global health actors – might influence particular forms of corruption. As health systems 
research on corruption goes forward, there is need for these research agendas to be 
combined so that policy-makers can see how formal and informal systems intertwine and 
shape one another in different contexts. Such an approach will allow analysts to understand 
how opportunities for corruption are created for some actors and will offer crucial insights 
into the spaces in which rule enforcement is likely to be more effective.  
Importantly, ddespite apparent moves from ‘good governance’ blueprints towards 
approaches informed by development governance that advocate for sector-specific, 
targeted interventions aimed at the most detrimental forms of corruption, we find no 
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evidence of the application of these new approaches within HPSR. Overall, the review has 
identified few studies that provide detail of the distinct political, social and economic 
contexts in which corruption occurs among frontline health workers in different settings in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, none of the studies consider the impact of gender, age, 
sexuality or ethnicity on patterns of corruption either in relation to the patient or provider. 
These are key issues to examine in the future in constructing feasible anti-corruption 
strategies.  
A health systems approach to corruption could usefully address the nature and power of 
formal and informal rules and the formal and informal distribution of resources 
simultaneously. Such an approach would draw together ideas of developmental governance 
from the broader field of international development and everyday governance (Gilson et al., 
2017). This would account for the dynamic, complex practices of decision-making in relation 
to formal and informal rules among frontline staff and provide intellectual space in which 
the cultural, historical and socio-political drivers of corruption could be analysed.  
Adopting approaches that focus on informal systems and rules to address complex yet weak 
health systems due to recent or ongoing conflict, underfunding, and lack of human resources 
must be undertaken with considerable care, however. Systems of patronage create 
inequalities but also solve problems – the Ebola response is a case in point, where patronage 
and informal systems structured the distribution of resources and played a critical role in 
determining who had access to care (Wilkinson and Leach, 2015). While often highly 
regressive (Kankeu and Ventelou, 2016), such systems may offer the only means of ensuring 
that health services function at all in crisis or rapid transformation contexts (Balabanova and 
McKee, 2002; Gaal and McKee, 2004).  
Reform efforts should also be undertaken in the knowledge that anti-corruption discourse 
can be used to attack and humiliate health workers as part of a wider political process to 
detract attention from corruption among elite actors, a group not likely to be targeted by 
political economy approaches.3 A further consideration is that advocating pockets of good 
practice (a key part of new approaches to anti-corruption) rather than having a system-wide 
approach is likely to be resisted by many HPSR researchers and health systems activists and 
practitioners, who are rightly suspicious of the impact of targeted programmes on the 
development of resilient, responsive and equitable health systems (Mills, 2005).  
The health sector is consistently identified as the most corrupt in many countries 
(Transparency International, 2013). This matters. Corruption undermines trust in the system, 
as well as the policies to promote effective, equitable and responsive health care (Berger, 
2014); it leads to preventable deaths (Hanf et al., 2011); and likely represents a major barrier 
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (Mackey et al., 2018). For too long, 
corruption has been avoided in health systems and policy discourses (Hutchinson et al., 
2018b). By applying a health-systems lens, we have begun to examine the reasons why 
 
3
 See, for example, the case in Wakiso District in Uganda, when President Museveni fired health workers who had been 
reported as absent from their health facility by members of the local community, and the resulting investigation into 
misconduct (Kiggundu, 2016).  
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corrupt behaviours emerge and persist in certain settings, including the structural aspects of 
the health system that provide opportunities for health workers to engage in informal 
practices and impel them to do so. We have considered drivers of corruption that are both 
generalisable and context-specific, which could inform further research to develop 
pragmatic measures to combat it. 
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Appendix 1 
Literature search  
  
Identification: 30,000 + papers using 
database search  
Papers from DFID anti-corruption evidence 
consortium = 4 
Duplicates and high-income countries 
removed = 10,000 papers 
Internal search of 10,000 papers using new 
search terms = 8  
Identification of papers from forward 
searching of the original 8 = 3  
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Appendix 2 
Table A1 Types of corruption addressed in the literature 
Type of corruption Author(s) 
Absenteeism  Lindelow and Serneels (2006) 
Paina et al. (2014) show that dual practice can lead to absenteeism  
Stringhini et al. (2009) mostly focus on informal payments but also touch on 
absenteeism 
Serneels et al. (2016) 
Topp et al. (2014) 
Tweheyo et al. (2017) 
Informal payments (including unofficial 
charges) 
Akwataghibe et al. (2013)
4
 consider both gift-giving and fees from patients as 
part of dual practice, a behaviour that is also mentioned by health workers as 
part of illegal practices in facilities but this is not explored in detail  
Pieterse and Lodge (2015) 
Mæstad and Mwisongo (2011) 
Ferrinho et al. (2004) 
Lindkvist (2013) 
Lindelow and Serneels (2006) report the downgrading of services when 
patients do not make extra payments 
Stringhini et al. (2009) 
Dual practice  Lindelow and Serneels (2006) report informal dual practice by nurses from 
their houses 
Paina et al. (2014) discuss dual working and the possible implications for 
absenteeism and diverting time from the public sector 
Akwataghibe et al. (2013) refer to this as moonlighting and include times when 
the health worker should be at their official place of work and times when they 
should not. Private practice outside working hours is legal for doctors in both 
states that they report on 
Stringhini et al. (2009) mention dual practice but do not explore it in detail  
Rule-breaking related to drugs/theft Lindelow and Serneels (2006) 
Paina et al. (2014) explore how dual practice can lead to pilfering of medicines 
Ferrinho et al. (2004) discuss pilfering of drugs 
Akwataghibe et al. (2013) describe predatory coping mechanisms such as 
pilfering medicines and selling drugs in health facilities (they also explore 
selling drugs outside health facilities but this is not necessarily corruption)  
Bribes Lindelow and Serneels (2006) 
Baez Camargo and Faustine (2015) 
Inappropriate referral to private-sector 
facilities or pharmacies for care 
Lindelow and Serneels (2006) consider referral to particular private pharmacies 
Akwataghibe et al. (2013) do not investigate this behaviour in detail but it is 
mentioned by health workers in surveys 
Recruitment Baez Camargo and Koechlin (2018) 
General/non-specific forms of corruption Stahl and Kassa (2018) 




 Akwataghibe et al. (2013) report on a range of coping strategies that health workers are involved in, which are divided 
into predatory and non-predatory. Practices that we associate with corruption tend to fall into the predatory category. 
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